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THE IMPACT OF NEGOTIATOR STYLES ON  
BARGAINING INTERACTIONS1 
 
35 AMER. J. TRIAL ADVOCACY 1 (2011) 
 
 By Charles B. Craver2 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 When attorneys negotiate with one another, most exhibit a Cooperative/Problem-
Solving or Competitive/Adversarial approach.3  Cooperative/Problem-Solvers usually 
employ a problem-solving approach designed to generate mutually beneficial 
agreements,4 while Competitive/Adversarials use a more adversarial style that is intended 
to generate more one-sided results.5 Opposite traits can be attributed to these different 
styles. 
 COOPERATIVE/PROBLEM-  COMPETITIVE/ADVERSARIAL 
  SOLVING  
 
 Move Psychologically Toward  Move Psychologically Against 
  Opponent       Opponent 
                                                 
1  Copyright 2010 by Charles B. Craver.  
 
2  Freda H. Alverson Professor, George Washington University Law School. B.S., 1967, 
Cornell University; M. Indus. & Labor Rels., 1968, Cornell University School of 
Industrial & Labor Relations; J.D., 1971, University of Michigan. 
 
3  See generally GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND 
SETTLEMENT (1983); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: 
Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 143 (2002). 
 
4  See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES (1981); 
ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, 
BEYOND WINNING (2000). 
 
5  See generally JIM CAMP, START WITH NO (2002); ROGER DAWSON, SECRETS 
OF POWER NEGOTIATING (2d ed. 2001); ROBERT J. RINGER, WINNING 
THROUGH INTIMIDATION (1973). 
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 Try to Maximize Joint Returns  Try to Maximize Own Returns 
 Strive for Reasonable Results   Strive for Extreme Results 
 Courteous and Sincere   Adversarial and Disingenuous 
 Begin with Realistic Opening   Begin with Unrealistic Opening 
                          Positions           Positions 
 Rely on Objective Standards   Focus on Positions Rather than 
        Neutral Standards 
 Rarely Resort to Threats   Frequently Resort to Threats 
 Maximize Information Disclosure  Minimize Information Disclosure 
 Open and Trusting    Closed and Untrusting 
 Work to Satisfy Underlying   Work to Satisfy Underlying 
        Opponent Interests          Interests of Own Side 
 Willing to Make Unilateral   Work to Induce Opponent to Make 
  Concessions              Unilateral Concessions 
 Try to Reason with Opponents  Try to Manipulate Opponents 
 
 Cooperative/Problem-Solvers usually commence interactions with realistic 
positions that are likely to generate positive bargaining environments.6 They behave in a 
courteous and professional manner that is designed to create harmonious relationships. 
They are quite open with respect to their important information, and they work to explore 
the underlying interests of both sides to enable them to ascertain and expand the overall 
pie to be divided by the negotiating parties. This approach enables them to achieve 
efficient agreements that maximize the joint gains obtained by the interactants. They try 
to rely upon objective criteria to guide the discussions, to enable the bargainers to reach 
fair, win-win agreements. Cooperative/Problem-Solvers rarely employ threats or other 
disruptive tactics, preferring to rely upon cooperative strategies that are designed to 
generate reciprocal movement. 
                                                 
6  See LAURENCE J. BOULLE, MICHAEL T. COLATRELLA JR. & ANTHONY P. 
PICCHIONI, MEDIATION SKILLS AND TECHNIQUES 158-159 (2008); ROY J. 




 Competitive/Adversarials usually commence their interactions with more extreme 
positions that are employed to intimidate their adversaries.7 They endeavor to attain one-
sided accords favoring their own side. They often resort to threats or other disruptive 
techniques in an effort to keep their adversaries on the defensive. They try not to disclose 
their negative information, and embellish their positive information to enable them to 
convince opponents that they possess greater strength than they actually possess. They 
work to induce adversaries to bid against themselves through the inadvertent articulation 
of unreciprocated concessions. When Competitive/Adversarials believe it will advance 
their own interests, they employ rude and unprofessional behavior. 
 This article will initially assess the relative effectiveness of the 
Cooperative/Problem-Solving and Competitive/Adversarial styles. Which approach is 
likely to generate optimal individual results and optimal joint results? How should 
Cooperative/Problem-Solvers interact with Competitive/Adversarials to avoid 
exploitation by such manipulative opponents? It will then consider a hybrid approach 
which incorporates the most effective characteristics of both styles in an effort to 
generate mutually beneficial accords which tend to favor one side more than the other. 
II. RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF COOPERATIVE/PROBLEM-SOLVING 
 AND COMPETITIVE/ADVERSARIAL STYLES  
 An increasing number of lawyers seem to believe that Competitive/Adversarial 
negotiators who employ deceptive, aggressive, and occasionally abrasive tactics are more 
likely to achieve beneficial results for their own side than Cooperative/Problem-Solving 
                                                 
7  See BOULLE, COLATRELLA & PICCHIONI, supra note 6, at 152-153; LEWICKI & 
HIAM, supra note 6, at 73-91. 
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bargainers. I have observed this phenomenon both when I mediate employment law 
disputes and when I talk with attorneys at my continuing legal education courses on 
negotiating. When I was in practice thirty-five years ago in San Francisco, I almost never 
encountered a rude or unprofessional opponent. Although both sides sought to obtain 
agreements that were favorable to their respective clients, we did so in a courteous and 
professional way. As a society in general and a profession in particular, we are no longer 
as polite to one another. Lawyers frequently tell me about extremely rude adversaries, 
and I occasionally encounter such persons when I mediate. This approach is entirely 
contrary to the way in which people behave. When individuals are insulting, we want to 
reject their entreaties to avoid rewarding them for their improper conduct. On the other 
hand, when persons are kind and respectful, we feel guilty if refuse to provide them with 
what they are seeking. 
 The thought that Competitive/Adversarial negotiators are more effective than 
Cooperative/Problem-Solver bargainers was contradicted by separate empirical studies 
conducted by Professors Gerald Williams and Andrea Schneider. Professor Williams 
conducted his study of lawyers in Phoenix in 1976.8 He asked respondents to indicate 
whether attorneys with whom they had recently interacted were Cooperative/Problem-
Solvers or Competitive/Adversarials. He found that 65 percent were classified as 
Cooperative/Problem-Solvers, 24 percent as Competitive/Adversarials, and 11 percent 
did not fit within either category.9 The respondents also indicated that they considered the 
results achieved by effective Cooperative/Problem-Solvers to be as beneficial for their 
                                                 
8  See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 3. 
 
9  See id. at 19. 
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clients as the results attained by effective Competitive/Adversarials.10 Nonetheless, he 
found that far fewer Competitive/Adversarial negotiators were considered effective vis-à-
vis Cooperative/Problem-Solvers. 
 Professor Williams asked the respondents to indicate whether the persons they 
had described were “effective,” “average,” or “ineffective” negotiators. Fifty-nine percent 
of Cooperative/problem-Solvers were considered to be “effective,” 38 percent were 
considered to be “average,” and only 3 percent were considered to be “ineffective.”11 On 
the other hand, only 25 percent of Competitive/Adversarials were considered to be 
“effective,” 42 percent were considered to be “average,” and 33 percent were considered 
to be “ineffective.” 
 In 1999, Professor Schneider replicated the Williams study with lawyers in 
Chicago and Milwaukee.12 Her respondents characterized 64 percent of their opponents 
as Cooperative/Problem-Solvers and 36 percent as Competitive/Adversarials.13 She also 
asked whether these persons were “effective,” “average,” or “ineffective” negotiators. 
She found that 54 percent of Cooperative/problem-Solvers were considered to be 
“effective,” 42 percent were considered to be “average,” and 4 percent were considered 
to be “ineffective.”14 On the other hand, only 9 percent of Competitive/Adversarials were 
considered to be “effective,” 37 percent were considered to be “average,” and 53 percent 
                                                 
10  See id. at 41. 
 
11  See id. at 19. 
 
12  See generally Schneider, supra note 3. 
 
13  See id. at 163. 
 
14  See id. at 167. 
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were considered to be “ineffective.” Although the ratings for Cooperative/Problem-
Solvers did not change much from the Williams study, the ratings for 
Competitive/Adversarials changed significantly. The percentage of “effective” 
Competitive/Adversarials dropped from 25 percent in the Williams study to 9 percent in 
the Schneider study, and the percentage of “ineffective” Competitive/Adversarials 
increased from 33 percent in the Williams study to 53 percent in the Schneider study. 
These changes are not surprising when one considers the fact that the adjectives used to 
describe Competitive/Adversarial bargainers were more negative in the Schneider study 
than in the Williams study.15 
 In the thirty-five years I have taught Legal Negotiating, I have not found 
Cooperative/Problem-Solvers to be less effective negotiators than Competitive/ 
Adversarials. The idea that persons must be uncooperative, manipulative, and  
intimidating to achieve beneficial results is incorrect. Bargainers only have to have the 
ability to say “no” with conviction to be able to attain good results. Proficient individuals 
can accomplish their objectives courteously and professionally, and be as effective as 
those who behave more demonstrably. I have only noticed three significant differences 
with respect to the outcomes achieved by Cooperative/Problem-Solver and Competitive/ 
Adversarial negotiators. First, when one-sided accords are reached, the prevailing party is 
almost always a Competitive/Adversarial bargainer. This reflects the fact that 
Cooperative/Problem-Solvers tend to be fair minded individuals who hesitate to take 
undue advantage of inept adversaries. Second, Competitive/Adversarials generate more 
                                                 




nonsettlements than Cooperative/Problem-Solvers. The inability of such persons to 
achieve accords is caused by their frequent use of manipulative and disruptive tactics 
which induce their opponents to more readily accept the consequences associated with 
nonsettlements. 
 The third factor concerns the fact that Cooperative/Problem-Solvers usually 
achieve more efficient combined results than Competitive/Adversarials. This 
phenomenon is due primarily to the fact that Cooperative/Problem-Solvers are open and 
trusting negotiators who strive to generate mutually beneficial agreements that maximize 
the joint returns attained. Individuals who hope to reach highly efficient agreements must 
be willing to work with their adversaries to determine areas for possible joint gains and to 
exploit those opportunities. Even when they endeavor to obtain terms beneficial to their 
own clients, they appreciate the fact that by expanding the overall pie to be shared they 
increase the likelihood of obtaining the results they desire. 
 How can lawyers who seek to employ the Cooperative/Problem-Solving approach 
increase the likelihood of interacting with like-minded negotiators? They can join the 
Collaborative Law or the Cooperative Law movement. The Collaborative Law approach 
began in the early 1990s by family law practitioners who wished to minimize the 
adversarial nature of their negotiations.16 Attorneys who join these groups commit 
                                                 
16  See generally NANCY J. CAMERON, COLLABORATIVE LAW PRACTICE 
DEEPENING THE DIALOGUE (2004); SHEILA M. GUTTERMAN, 
COLLABORATIVE LAW: A NEW MODEL FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2004); 
PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE 
RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION (2001); PAULINE H. 
TESSLER & PEGGY THOMPSON, COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE: THE 
REVOLUTIONARY NEW WAY TO RESTRUCTURE YOUR FAMILY, RESOLVE 
LEGAL ISSUES, AND MOVE ON WITH YOUR LIFE (2006); STUART G. WEBB & 
RON D. OUSKY, THE COLLABORATIVE WAY TO DIVORCE: THE 
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themselves and their clients to entirely open and cooperative interactions. They promise 
to be forthright and direct, and to avoid bluffing, puffing, or other value-claiming 
behavior. The most controversial aspect of the Collaborative Law approach concerns a 
provision requiring the selected legal representatives to withdraw from further 
representation of their respective clients when amicable resolutions are not developed. If 
these matters have to be litigated in court, the clients are required to obtain new counsel 
to represent them. 
 To avoid potential conflicts between attorney desires and client interests that 
might be generated by the disqualification provisions included in Collaborative Law 
representation agreements, some lawyers have formed the Cooperative Law approach 
which embodies the same disclosure and cooperative concepts associated with the 
Collaborative Law movement, but which does not require counsel to withdraw if mutual 
accords are not achieved.17 
 Collaborative Law and Cooperative Law participants are attorneys who have 
whole-heartedly embraced the Getting to Yes approach to negotiating. They are 
uncomfortable with the deception and manipulation associated with traditional bargaining 
interactions, and they wish to work with others who are completely forthright and 
interested in the formulation of agreements that are mutually beneficial. They believe that 
such cooperative exchanges most effectively protect the interests of their clients. 
III. CONFLICTING NEGOTIATOR STYLE INTERACTIONS 
                                                                                                                                                 
REVOLUTIONARY METHOD THAT RESULTS IN LESS STRESS, LOWER COSTS, 
AND HAPPIER KIDS – WITHOUT GOING TO COURT (2006). 
 
17  See generally John Lande, Practical Insights From an Empirical Study of Cooperative 
Lawyers in Wisconsin, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 203 (2008). 
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 When Cooperative/Problem-Solvers interact with other Cooperative/Problem-
Solvers, their encounters are generally open and cooperative,18 while interactions 
between Competitive/Adversarials tend to be closed and manipulative.19 When 
Cooperative/Problem-Solvers interact with Competitive/Adversarials, their encounters 
tend to be more competitive than cooperative.20  The Cooperative/Problem-Solving 
participants are compelled to behave in a more competitive fashion to avoid the 
exploitation that would probably result if they were overly candid and accommodating 
with their manipulative adversaries. Such cross-style encounters tend to generate less 
efficient agreements and an increased number of impasses.21 This factor may explain 
why Professors Williams and Schneider found a far greater percentage of effective 
Cooperative/Problem-Solver negotiators than Competitive/Adversarial negotiators. 
 When Competitive/Adversarial bargainers interact with Cooperative/Problem-
Solver negotiators, the Competitive/Adversarial participants enjoy a clear advantage – if  
their Cooperative/Problem-Solving opponents continue to operate in a naively 
cooperative fashion.22 Competitive/Adversarial individuals feel more comfortable in an 
openly competitive setting than their Cooperative/Problem-Solving opponents who may 
                                                 
18  See HOWARD RAIFFA (WITH JOHN RICHARDSON & DAVID METCALFE), 
NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS 288-291 (2003). 
 
19  See id. at 298-301. 
 
20  See Catherine H.Tinsley, Kathleen M. O’Connor & Brandon A. Sullivan, Tough Guys 
Finish Last: The Perils of a Distributive Reputation, 88 ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAVIOR & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 621, 634-635 (2002). 
 
21  See id. at 635. 
 
22  See MICHAEL WATKINS, SHAPING THE GAME 78 (2006); LARRY L. TEPLEY, 
LEGAL NEGOTIATION IN A NUT SHELL 59-60 (2d ed. 2005). 
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be forced to behave in an uncharacteristically competitive manner to protect their own 
interests. Cooperative/Problem-Solvers are likely to disclose more critical information 
than Competitive/Adversarials, and they tend to seek less beneficial terms for themselves.  
 When Cooperative/Problem-Solvers commence interactions with persons they do 
not know well, they should be cautious with respect to the confidential client information 
they initially disclose. To protect themselves from exploitation by less open Competitive/ 
Adversarial opponents, they should initially disclose less critical information and see if 
their candor is being reciprocated. If they are confident that their adversaries are being 
equally open, they can continue to be forthcoming and work to jointly ascertain the 
underlying interests of the parties. Such candor will enable them to have open discussions 
that would be likely to maximize the joint returns generated. Nonetheless, if they suspect 
that their initial openness is not being reciprocated, they must behave more strategically 
and disclose less of their important information. Negotiators who fail to change their 
behavior in this fashion will leave themselves open to exploitation by Competitive/ 
Adversarial opponents who use the information imbalance to obtain one-sided accords 
favoring themselves. 
IV.  THE COMPETITIVE/PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH  
 When Professor Williams conducted his study of Phoenix attorneys, he 
discovered that certain traits are shared by both effective Cooperative/Problem-Solving 
negotiators and effective Competitive/Adversarial bargainers.23 They are thoroughly 
prepared, conduct themselves in an honest and ethical manner, are perceptive readers of 
opponent verbal leaks and nonverbal cues, are analytical, realistic, and convincing, and 
                                                 
23  See WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 20-30. 
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observe the customs and courtesies of the bar. He also found that skilled bargainers from 
both groups desire to maximize their own side’s returns. Professor Schneider also found 
this client maximizing objective among both effective Cooperative/Problem-Solving and 
effective Competitive/Adversarial negotiators.24 Since a desire to maximize one own 
side’s returns is the quintessential characteristic associated with Competitive/Adversarial 
negotiators, the discovery of this common trait among both effective 
Cooperative/Problem-Solver and Competitive/Adversarial bargainers would indicate that 
many persons who are characterized by their opponents as effective 
Cooperative/Problem-Solving negotiators are actually wolves in sheepskin. They behave 
as if they are employing an open and cooperative style, but they subtly work to obtain 
competitive objectives.25 
 Skilled negotiators are able to combine the most salient traits associated with the 
Cooperative/Problem-Solving and the Competitive/Adversarial styles.26 They work to 
maximize the returns they obtain for their own clients, but they endeavor to accomplish 
                                                 
24  See Schneider, supra note 3, at 188. 
 
25  See Hal Movius, The Effectiveness of Negotiation Training, 24 NEGOT. J. 509, 513-
515 (2008); Keith G. Allred, Distinguishing Best and Strategic Practices: A Framework 
for Managing the Dilemma Between Creating and Claiming Value, 16 NEGOT. J. 387, 
394-396 (2000). 
 
26  See Robert J. Condlin, “Every Day and in Every Way We Are All Becoming Meta and 
Meta”, or How Communitarian Bargaining Theory Conquered the World (of Bargaining 
Theory, 23 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 231, 298-299 (2008); Margaret A. Neale & 
Allison R. Fragale, Social Cognition, Attribution, and Perception in Negotiation: The 
Role of Uncertainty in Shaping Negotiation Processes and Outcomes in NEGOTIATION 
THEORY AND RESEARCH 27, 32 (Leigh L. Thompson, ed.) (2006). See generally 
Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining With a Hugger: The Weaknesses and Limitations of a 
Communitarian Conception of Legal Dispute Bargaining, or Why We Can’t All Just Get 
Along, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1 (2007). 
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this objective in a courteous and seemingly cooperative manner.27 They appreciate the 
childhood admonition expressed by many parents that “you get more with honey than 
you do with vinegar.”  They also recognize the importance of expanding the overall pie to 
be divided between the bargaining parties. Unlike less skilled bargainers who think of 
negotiation interactions as “fixed pie” situations in which one side’s gain is the other 
side’s corresponding loss, they understand that in multi-issue interactions the participants 
usually value the various items quite differently.28 Even when the principle issue is 
money, the parties can agree to future payments or in-kind payments to generate more 
efficient final agreements. Adroit negotiators appreciate the inherent tension between 
“value creation” and “value claiming.”29 Although they strive to claim more of the 
distributive items desired by both sides, they look for integrative terms valued more by 
one side than by the other in recognition of the fact that if these terms are resolved 
efficiently, both sides will achieve better results.30 They are quite open with respect to 
underlying client interests to enable the interactants to look for areas of possible joint 
gain, but they frequently over- or under-state the degree to which their clients actually 
want the various items to enable them to obtain more of the joint surplus than they give to 
                                                 
27  See ROBERT D. MAYER, POWER PLAYS 7-8, 92 (1996). 
 
28  See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, 
BEYOND WINNING 14-15, 174 (2000). 
 
29  See Alex J. Hurder, The Lawyer’s Dilemma: To Be or Not to Be a Problem-Solving 
Negotiator, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 253, 271-279 (2007). See generally Charles B. 
Craver, The Inherent Tension Between Value Creation and Value Claiming During 
Bargaining Interactions,  __ CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RES. __  (2010) (firthcoming). 
 
30  See WATKINS, supra note 22, at 8-9; RONALD M. SHAPIRO & MARK A. 
JANKOWSLI, THE POWER OF NICE 45-61 (2001). 
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their opponents. If they think their adversaries really want several issues their side does 
not value highly, they may exaggerate their interest in those terms to make it appear that 
they are conceding more than they actually are. If their side really desires specific items 
they believe the opposing party does not consider important, they may under-state their 
actual interest in those terms to enable them to obtain them in exchange for less 
significant concessions. 
 Competitive/Problem-Solvers recognize that if the parties maximize the way in 
which the integrative terms are resolved, it is easier for them to claim more of the 
distributive items. Although they may manipulate opponent perceptions with respect to 
the degree to which they value particular terms, they do not employ truly deceitful 
tactics.31 They realize that a loss of credibility would seriously undermine their capacity 
to obtain beneficial accords. Even though they hope to obtain a greater share of the joint 
surplus, they are not “win-lose” Competitive/Adversarial negotiators. Nor are they the 
“win-win” Cooperative/Problem-Solvers they appear to be. As Competitive/Problem-
Solvers, they employ a hybrid style which Ronald Shapiro and Mark Jankowski 
characterize as “WIN-win: big win for your side, little win for theirs.”32 They understand 
                                                 
31  Although Model Rule 4.1 provides that it is unethical for an attorney to “make a false 
statement of material fact or law to a third person,” Comment 2 expressly exempts 
statements regarding the degree to which clients value the items being exchanged. 
“Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements 
ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed 
on the subject of a transaction and a party’s intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a 
claim are ordinarily in this category . . .” THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. 
ROTUNDA, 2008 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 92-93 (2008). See generally Charles B. Craver, Negotiation Ethics 
for Real World Interactions, 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 299 (2010). 
 
32  SHAPIRO & JANKOWSKI, supra note 30, at 5 (emphasis in original). 
 
 14 
that the imposition of poor terms on their adversaries does not necessarily benefit their 
own clients. All other factors being equal, they wish to maximize opponent satisfaction, 
as long as this does not require significant concessions with respect to terms valued by 
their own side.33 At the conclusion of bargaining encounters, they do not compare the 
results they have achieved with those obtained by their adversaries. They instead ask 
themselves whether their clients like what they received. 
 Competitive/Problem-Solvers appreciate the importance of negotiation process. 
Studies indicate that persons who believe that the bargaining process has been fair and 
they have been treated respectfully are more satisfied with objectively less beneficial 
final terms than they are with objectively more beneficial terms achieved through a 
process considered less fair and less respectful.34 This explains why proficient 
Competitive/Problem-Solvers always treat their adversaries with respect and act 
professionally. They are also careful at the conclusion of interactions to leave opponents 
with the feeling those persons obtained “fair” results. 
 Competitive/Problem-Solvers do not work to maximize opponent returns for 
purely altruistic reasons. They appreciate the fact that such behavior most effectively 
enhances their ability to advance their own interests. They understand that they must 
offer their opponents sufficiently generous terms to induce those persons to accept the 
agreements they are proposing. If they fail to propose accords within opponent settlement 
                                                 
33  See generally Leaf Van Boven & Leigh Thompson, A Look into the Mind of the 
Negotiator: Mental Models in Negotiation, 6 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP 
RELS. 387 (2003). 
 
34  See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation: 
Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & 
SOCIAL INQUIRY 473 (2008). 
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ranges, no agreements will be achieved. They also want to be certain that adversaries will 
honor the terms agreed upon. If opponents experience post-agreement “buyers remorse,” 
they may refuse to effectuate those accords. The final consideration concerns the fact that 
attorneys often interact with the same opponents in the future. If those individuals feel 
that their current encounters have been pleasant and beneficial, they will look forward to 
future interactions with those persons.35 
 Why are Competitive/Problem-Solvers more able to obtain beneficial results for 
their clients than Cooperative/Problem-Solvers or Competitive/Adversarials? They 
appreciate the fact that true Cooperative/Problem-Solvers are too open and trusting. 
Those negotiators are too quick to disclose their actual underlying interests and the 
degree to which they value the different items to be exchanged. Such bargainers tend to 
have modest aspirations, and their desire for true “win-win” results causes them to 
generate efficient but personally modest agreements. Competitive/Adversarial bargainers 
establish elevated aspirations and seek one-sided results favoring their own side, but they 
frequently behave in an aggressive and adversarial manner. Such behavior turns off 
cooperative opponents, and generates an excessive number of nonsettlements where 
accords could have been achieved. It also produces less efficient terms when agreements 
are reached. 
 Negotiators who employ the hybrid Competitive/Problem-Solving approach are 
able to obtain optimal results for their clients by appearing to be entirely open and 
cooperative, when they are actually being somewhat closed and manipulative. Keith 
Allred found this approach to be highly effective when he conducted empirical studies of 
                                                 
35  See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, 3-D NEGOTIATION 17-18 (2006). 
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the factors possessed by skilled negotiators. He conducted exercises used to ascertain the 
degree to which adroit bargainers employ “strategic practices” designed to enable them to 
claim more of joint surpluses for themselves and “integrating and accommodating 
practices” designed to maximize the joint returns achieved. He discovered that the most 
successful negotiators were individuals who were considered by their adversaries to use 
primarily “integrating and accommodating practices,” even those these persons admitted 
that they frequently employed “strategic practices” to advance their own interests.36 
 The fact that many Competitive/Problem-Solver negotiators are considered by 
their opponents to be conventional Cooperative/Problem-Solver bargainers may partially 
explain why Professors Williams and Schneider found more effective Cooperative/ 
Problem-Solving negotiators than effective Competitive/Adversarial bargainers. It is 
likely that many effective Competitive/Problem-Solving negotiators who subtly 
employed competitive tactics were so successful in their use of seemingly cooperative 
techniques, that they induced their opponents to characterize them as “cooperative” rather 
than “competitive.”  
 Although many people seem to believe that Cooperative/Problem-Solving 
negotiators generate more efficient agreements than individuals who may be subtly or 
overtly competitive, an empirical study by Professors Kathleen O’Connor and Peter 
Carnevale contradicts this assumption.37 Their study concerned “common-value issues” 
that both sides wished to have resolved in the same manner even though the participants 
                                                 
36  See Allred, supra note 25, at 394-395. 
 
37  See Kathleen M. O’Connor & Peter J. Carnevale, A Nasty But Effective Negotiation 
Strategy: Misrepresentation of a Common-Value Issue, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCH. BULLETIN 504 (1997). 
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were not aware of their positional overlap. Some of the bargaining pairs were entirely 
open and cooperative with respect to their interests, while other dyads included 
negotiators who could be disingenuous with respect to their actual interests. O’Connor 
and Carnevale found that the individualistically motivated pairs generated higher joint 
outcomes than the cooperatively motivated pairs. This was apparently due to the fact the 
individualistically motivated negotiators established higher overall objectives for 
themselves than did the cooperatively motivated participants. The individualistically 
motivated persons recognized that by generating the most efficient overall agreements 
they increased the likelihood they would obtain optimal results for themselves. 
 The Competitive/Problem-Solving approach can be especially effective when 
employed by Collaborative Law or Cooperative Law movement members. If these 
manipulative negotiators can convince their colleagues that they are being completely 
open and cooperative when they are not being entirely forthright and they subtly employ 
distributive techniques to enable them to claim more of the joint surplus being generated, 
they should be able to achieve terms that are more beneficial to their own clients than the 
terms being obtained by their opponents. 
 When Collaborative Law, Cooperative Law, or other legal practitioners 
commence bargaining interactions with individuals they do not know extremely well, 
they should be circumspect. If the behavior of their opponents indicates that they are 
competitive negotiators seeking to maximize their own results, these persons should be 
less candid and more circumspect. If their adversaries begin with more extreme positions, 
they should also articulate positions favoring their own clients. If they instead open with 
positions close to where they really hope to end up, they will almost always obtain less 
 18 
beneficial results. Parties tend to move from their opening positions toward the center, 
and the parties beginning with more skewed opening offers or demands tend to obtain 
skewed results favoring their own side. 
 As noted in Part III, naturally open negotiators should not be excessively open at 
the commencement of interactions with others. They should expose some non-critical 
information regarding their needs and interests and see if their candor is being 
reciprocated. If it is, they can continue to cautiously disclose more information. If it is 
not, however, they have to be less open. If one side is entirely open while the other side is 
being less candid, an information imbalance is created which favors the less open 
participant. If individuals think their adversaries are over- or under-stating the value of 
different items for strategic purposes, they should not naively disclose their own true 
needs and interests. Although they would be most effective if they similarly over- or 
under-stated their own circumstances, some truly cooperative bargainers might not feel 
comfortable with such manipulative tactics. Such persons could alternatively withhold – 
rather than misrepresent – their true needs and interests, to avoid placing themselves and 
their clients at a bargaining disadvantage. 
 Is it ethical for members of formal Collaborative Law or Cooperative Law 
movements to employ the Competitive/Problem-Solving style when they interact with 
other group members? I think that such a manipulative approach would be entirely 
improper. Members of such groups have formally committed themselves and their clients 
to complete disclosure and to cooperative conduct. The only way in which individuals 
can be true to such undertakings is to employ the Cooperative/Problem-Solving approach. 
When they withhold or even minimally distort client information or they seek to obtain 
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an inappropriately large portion of the joint surplus, they violate their group norms. 
Nonetheless, Collaborative Law and Cooperative Law group members must appreciate 
the possibility that some of their cohorts may actually employ the Competitive/Problem-
Solving style in a fashion that may be undetectable by most of their opponents.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 Most negotiation books and courses divide lawyers into Cooperative/Problem-
Solving or Competitive/Adversarial groups. Cooperative/Problem-Solvers are open and 
cooperative, and they work to generate mutually beneficial agreements. Competitive/ 
Adversarials are less open, more manipulative, and work to maximize their own side 
returns. Studies conducted by Professors Williams and Schneider found that twice as 
many attorneys are considered by their peers to be Cooperative/Problem-Solvers than 
Competitive/Adversarials, and that far more Cooperative/ Problem-Solvers are 
considered to be effective bargainers than Competitive/Adversarials. 
 When Cooperative/Problem-Solvers interact with Competitive/Adversarials, they 
have to modify their behavior to avoid exploitation by such manipulative opponents. 
They have to be less open and behave more strategically. If they are excessively candid 
or begin with naively generous opening positions, they provide such adversaries with a 
distinct bargaining advantage. 
 Many proficient negotiators employ a hybrid Competitive/Problem-Solving style. 
They behave in a seemingly open and cooperative manner, but are not entirely open, and 
they subtly employ manipulative techniques to obtain a greater share of the joint surplus 
that is created. They behave in a courteous and professional manner, in recognition of the 
fact that this increases the likelihood they will achieve their objectives. Although their 
 20 
opponents think they are behaving in a cooperative fashion, they admittedly employ 
disingenuous tactics to advance their interests. Opponents who do not appreciate the 
degree to which the Competitive/Problem-Solving style may be employed successfully 
are likely to concede more to these adversaries than they should. 
